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In Hartness v. Patterson' the Supreme Court of South Carolina
held unconstitutional a statute which provides for the use of public
funds as tuition grants for students attending church-controlled col-
leges. Act No. 1191 passed by the 1970 General Assembly2 provides for
the use of public funds as tuition grants to students attending indepen-
dent institutions of higher learning. Twenty-one institutions in South
Carolina meet the statutory definition in the Act; at least sixteen of
those institutions "[A]re operated under the direction or control of
religious groups or denominations." The Act creates a committee to
administer the grants, sets forth eligibility requirements for students to
receive grants, makes grants unavailable to any student enrolled in a
course of study leading to a degree in theology, divinity or religious
education, and sets out standards which the participating institutions
must meet. The single issue before the court was whether such tuition
grants to students attending those institutions controlled by religious
or sectarian organizations, constitute the use of public funds in aid of
such institutions, a use prohibited by Article XI, Section 9 of the South
Carolina Constitution.
3
The court first emphasized that the constitutional proscription
does not distinguish between aid which is designed primarily to benefit
the institution's religious function, and aid designed to benefit the insti-
tution in other respects. "If the use of the public funds aids the religious
institution, it is prohibited." The court also noted that the tuition
grants "[A]re paid to the student only as a member of the selected
school," and that under the Act,
1. 255 S.C. 503, 179 S.E.2d 907 (1971).
2. 56 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 2579 (1970).
3. S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 9, reads as follows:
The property or credit of the State of South Carolina, or of any...
other subdivision of the said State, or any public money, from whatever
source derived, shall not, by gift, donation, loan, contract, appropriation,
or otherwise, be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance of any
college, . . .which is wholly or in part under the direction or control of
any church or of any religious or sectarian denomination, society or organ-
ization.
1
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[Q]uite conceivably all, and most likely a majority, of the commit-
tee controlling the administration of the Act would come from the
schools controlled by the religious groups.'
The court thus concluded that the tuition grants constitute aid to the
participating institutions:
Students must pay tuition fees to attend institutions of higher
learning and the institutions depend upon the paymentof such fees
to aid in financing their operations. While it is true that the tuition
grant aids the student, it is also of material aid to the institution
to which it is paid ...
It is apparent that one of the main purposes of the tuition
grant is to reduce the cost to a student for attending the private
colleges and thereby attract additional students to their campuses
so as to fill their vacancies in their student body. Such would have
the effect of adding additional funds to their treasuries and thereby
improve their financial status. . . . Such constitutes aid to the
religious schools.,
Against a multi-faceted attack, the court in Hunt v. McNair'
upheld the constitutionality of the Educational Facilities Authority
Act,' a statute which authorizes the state budget and control board to
provide financing for institutions of higher learning by the issuance of
revenue bonds. Pursuant to the Act, the Baptist College of Charleston
sought approval of the Authority for the issuance of up to $3,500,000
in revenue bonds, to be used for three purposes: first, to pay off certain
outstanding indebtedness incurred in acquiring part of the college's
physical plant; second, partially to reimburse the College's Plant Fund
for equipment acquired and improvements made; and third, to refund
an outstanding indebtedness of the College (the College's first mort-
gage serial bonds). The College proposed to convey land and facilities
thereon to the Authority, which would then lease the land and facilities
back to the College at a rental sufficient to meet the payment of princi-
pal and interest on the proposed bonds as they became due; that lease
was to provide that the College, upon payment of the bonds, should
reacquire the land and facilities at no additional cost. The plaintiff
brought this suit as a taxpayer and as a resident, seeking a holding that
the Act was unconstitutional.
4. 255 S.C. at 507, 179 S.E.2d at 909.
5. Id. at 507-8, 179 S.E.2d at 909.
6. 255 S.C. 71, 177 S.E.2d 362 (1970).
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Although the single issue in the appeal was the constitutionality
of the Act and the validity of the actions taken pursuant thereto con-
cening the College, there were actually seven distinct constitutional
attacks presented, which are discussed separately herein.
The plaintiff first contended that the state's undertaking to finance
private educational facilities was not a public purpose for which the
state may issue bonds. The court noted that it is essential that the
state's colleges and universities "[B]e provided with appropriate addi-
tional means to assist. . . youth in achieving. . . development of their
intellectual and mental capacities," and concluded:
The true purpose of the Act is to provide a measure of assistance
and an alternative method . . . to accomplish this aim to the
public benefit. . . of all the people of this State. . . If the general
public benefit is the dominant interest served, constitutional de-
mands are not offended, even though the aid inures to the benefit
of a private institution.$
The plaintiff's second contention was that the Act violates the constitu-
tional prohibition against pledging the credit of the state for private
benefit,' and cited Feldman & Co. v. City Council0 and Bolton v.
Wharton" in support of his claim. The court distinguished Feldman
and Bolton on the ground that the bond issues declared invalid therein
were struck down solely because the bonds were payable from the
proceeds of taxation. On the other hand, the Act in question in Hunt
specifically requires that the bonds be paid solely by the participating
college; on that basis the court concluded that the only funds pledged
were the rental payments to be made by the College, that the state's
credit could never be adversely affected, and therefore that the Act did
not violate the constitutional proscription against pledging the state's
credit for private benefit.' 2
The plaintiff's third argument, that the Act violates due process
in that it "permits the expenditure of public moneys for the benefit of
a private corporation," was disposed of by the court's holding that no
8. 255 S.C. at 78, 177 S.E.2d at 366.
9. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 6.
10. 23 S.C. 57 (1883).
11. 163S.C. 242, 161 S.E. 454 (1931).
12. See Elliott v. MeNair, 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E.2d 421 (1967), which upheld the
South Carolina Industrial Revenue Bond Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 14-399.21 to -.35
(1970 Supp.), on similar grounds.
[Vol. 23
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public money was to be expended in the construction, financing and
refinancing under the Act.
The plaintiff next argued that the Act granted special privileges
to the College (and to other institutions utilizing the Act), and in so
doing violates the privileges and immunities section of the federal con-
stitution. The plaintiff's theory was that those persons who do not
qualify under the Act must pay a higher rate of interest, since the
interest on bonds issued under the Act is not subject to income taxa-
tion. Noting its previous holding in Elliott v. McNair,3 and the fact
that the Act's true purpose is in aid of education and not in the confer-
ring of special privileges, the court held that the provisions for favora-
ble interest rates for those institutions qualifying under the Act, did not
violate constitutional requirements of equal protection.
The plaintiff's fifth contention was that the College's option to
repurchase the land and facilities from the Authority, violates public
policy and the constitutional prohibition against the donation of public
property.'" The court refused to take such a narrow view of the option
arrangement, but instead considered it to be but a part of the entire
contract between the College and the Authority, and not as a separate
contract arising subsequent to the issuance of the bonds.
The sixth and most significant constitutional attack upon the Act,
was that it violates the constitutional proscription against the use of
state property or credit in aid or maintenance of church-supported
institutions. 5 Acknowledging that the College's operation is at least
13. 255 S.C. at 83, 17 S.E.2d at 368, quoting from 250 S.C. 75, 92-93, 156 S.E.2d
421,430:
[l]f the classification [of persons and property by the legislature] bears a
reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be effeced, and if
the constituents of each class are all treated alike under similar circumst-
ances and conditions, there is no infringement upon the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. . . . The fact that a private corporation, com-
ing within the provisions of the Act, may borrow money at a lesser rate
of interest than others who do not qualify under the Act, does not afford
any special privilege to such private corporation because the provisions of
said act apply equally to all corporations within the class provided for in
said Act.
14. S.C. CONST. art. Ill, § 31, reads as follows:
Lands belonging to or under the control of the State shall never be donat-
ed, directly or indirectly, to private corporations or individuals. . . . Nor
shall such land be sold to corporations, or associations, for a less price
than that for which it can be sold to individuals.
15. S.C. CONST. art. Xl, § 9.
19711
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partially controlled by the S.C. Baptist Convention, the court defined
the essential issue as whether the proposed financing constitutes a loan
or gift of the property or credit of the state in contravention of the state
constitution. The court first held that state properly was not involved,
"[I1nasmuch as the State will acquire (at no cost to the State) a title
subject to certain conditions, . . ." of which the College's option to
reacquire the land and facilities was one such condition; noting its
earlier conclusion that the credit of the state was in no way involved,
the court held that the proposed arrangement under the Act did not
violate the constitutional provision.
The plaintiff's final contention was that the State had unconstitu-
tionally enacted legislation respecting the establishment of religion and
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 6 The court concluded:
Having held that neither the credit . . . nor the property or the
State is involved, it follows that this constitutional provision is not
violated. There is no conflict between the preservation of religious
freedom and the preservation of higher education under the Edu-
cational Facilities Authority Act. 
7
An Act"8 authorizing the issuance of bonds by the University of
South Carolina to finance expansion and improvement of its football
stadium, was held as constitutional in Moye v. Board of Trustees.", The
Act was assailed on three grounds: first, that the special student fee
provided for therein constitutes a tax which is not a uniform and equal
tax and is therefore unconstitutional;20 second, that the Act is an uncon-
stitutional attempt to delegate the taxing power of the legislature to the
board of trustees of the university;"' and third, that the maintenance
16. S.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 4, reads, "The General Assembly shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . ."
17. 255 S.C. at 86, 177 S.E.2d at 370.
18. 56 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 2724 (1970) authorizes the issuance of $5 million of
special obligation bonds for enlarging and improving the football stadium of the Univers-
ity of South Carolina. The Act provides inpart that, to insure the payment of principal
and interest on the bonds, the trustees must impose a "special student fee" on each full-
time student; the special student fee must be sufficient (after taking into account other
sources of revenue) to provide for the payment of the principal and interest on the bonds,
19. 255 S.C. 46, 177 S.E.2d 137 (1970).
20. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 1, provides, "The General Assembly shall provide by
law for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation ....
21. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 1, provides, "The legislative power of this State shall
be vested in two distinct branches, the one to be styled the 'Senate' and the other the
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and improvement of the football stadium is not a necessary and proper
undertaking for an educational institution, and to require plaintiffs to
pay such a special student fee to accomplish such a purpose as a
prerequisite to obtaining an education, violates due process.
Concerning the first two attacks, the court concluded that the
special student fee was not subject to constitutional limitations applica-
ble to taxes. Finding statutory authority for such a fee,22 the court
noted:
That the public treasury may be relieved of the cost of a perma-
nent improvement to the extent of the student's contribution does
not mean that the student is being taxed. Instead, he is simply
paying a fee which, with other charges fixed by the Board of
Trustees, is lawfully required of him for the high privilege of at-
tending the University, which is heavily subsidized from the gen-
eral revenues of the State.?
Concerning the due process and equal protection attack, the plain-
tiffs further urged that the special student fee was unreasonable and
unfair because it must be paid by all students without regard to the
actual use of the facilities by the individual students. The court simply
noted an Iowa decision, which held, "The fact that a student may not
participate or take advantage of every facility available does not mean
that he is or or should be relieved from paying student fees allocated
to various projects."" The plaintiffs also argued that further expansion
of the stadium at the students' expense was unreasonable, when there
was more than sufficient capacity to seat the entire student body in the
present stadium; any further expansion of the stadium would only
benefit the general public and not the students, and therefore the eco-
nomic burden of the expansion should fall on the public rather than
upon the students. The court suggested that the plaintiffs should carry
such an argument before their legislators and before the Board of
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-104 (1962) reads as follows:
The Board of trustees of the University of South Carolina is and is hereby
constituted a body corporate and politic, in deed and in law under the name
of the University of South Carolina. Such corporation has the following
powers:
(9) To fix tuition fees and other charges for students attending the
University. . ..
23. 255 S.C. at 51, 177 S.E.2d at 139.
24. Id. at 53, 177 S.E.2d at 140 quoting from Iowa Hotel Ass'n v. State Bd. of
Regents, 253 Ia. 870, 114 N.W.2d 539, 544 (1962).
1971]
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Trustees, "[l]n whose hands the power to make such policy decisions
has been reposed." z The court thereafter concluded:
It is not the province of the court to substitute its judgment for
that of the authorities entrusted with the maintenance of the un-
iversity unless it is clear that these authorities have acted in abuse
of the powers vested in them.
Finding no such abuse of authority, the court held, "[T]he decision to
improve Carolina Stadium violated no statutory or constitutional
provision, expressed or implied, and was in compliance with 'due
process of law.' "
In Williams v. McNair2 a three-judge federal district court held
that a statute which limits regular admission to Winthrop College to
women, on the basis that certain courses are thought to be particularly
helpful to female students, was not without rational justification and
thus did not deny equal protection of the laws to ten male plaintiffs who
sought admission to the college. The single issue before the court was
whether the sexual discrimination in the admission of students to
Winthrop, created by the statute governing the operation of the col-
lege,2 was so arbitrary and wanting in rational justification that it
offends the equal protection clause of the federal constitution." Noting
the division of pedagogical opinion on the matter, and the trend away
from sexually-segregated education in this country, the court neverthe-
less cited stipulated facts to the effect that "[T]here is a respectable
body of educators who believe that a single-sex institution can advance
the quality and effectiveness of its instruction by concentrating upon
areas of primary interest to only one sex." The court further concluded
that the Constitution does not require that a classification keep abreast
of the most current expert educational opinion, especially when there
remains a respectable opinion to the contrary; on that basis the court
held that the statutory discrimination was not devoid of reason."5
25. See S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 8, which provides, "The General Assembly may
provide for the maintenance of. . .the University of South Carolina .... " See also
S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-104 (1962).
26. 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970).
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 etseq. (1962).
28. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
29. Id. The court carefully distinguished Kirstein v. Rector and Bd. of Visitors. 309
F. Supp. 184 (D.C. Va. 1970), which held that the University of Virginia could not
constitutionally limit admission to males. The Williams court's destinction was based
upon the Kirstein court's emphasis upon the pre-eminence of the University of Virginia
[Vol. 23
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II. IS THE ZOO UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
In Gould v. Barton3 ' the plaintiff mounted a fourteen-point consti-
tutional attack upon legislation establishing a special purpose district
in Richland and Lexington counties, created for the purpose of issuing
bonds for the construction of zoological and recreational facilities on
land in the two counties. The court held, inter alia, that the legislation
allowed an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, that the
special purpose district was therefore without a legally constituted
governing body, and thus that the district was unable to function or
issue bonds under the present legislation. The legislation establishing
the district actually survived all but three of the fourteen constitutional
attacks; each of the constitutional issues is summarized seriatim herein
In its 1969 and 1970 sessions, the General Assembly enacted
several statutes establishing the Richland-Lexington Riverbanks Parks
District (coterminous with Richland and Lexington counties) and a
seven-member Riverbanks Parks Commission. 31 One of the legislative
provisions attempted to define the geographical area in which the Com-
mission might operate by authoizing the establishment of public recrea-
tion and zoo facilities "[W]ithin the territory in the counties of Rich-
land and Lexington contiguous to the Saluda River and the Congaree
River from Highway 1-26 on the north to the Granby Locks on the
south. ' 32 The constitutional attack involved was that, since the above
description provides for no eastern and western boundaries, it was so
vague and uncertain as to make it impossible to ascertain the geograph-
ical area over which the Commission's jurisdiction extends. The court
noted that the legislative intent was not to define the Commission's
jurisdictional area, but "to require that the authorized recreation aid
zoo facilities be located within the area described." The court held,
"[T]here is nothing to indicate that the description is so vague and
indefinite as to make it impossible to determine the location of the
facilities in accord with the legislative intent."' ' The court further
among that state's public colleges: "It is not intimated that Winthrop offers a wider
range of subject matter or enjoys a position of outstanding prestige over the other State-
supported institutions in this State whose admissions policies are coeducational." 316
F. Supp. at 138-139.
30. 181 S.E.2d 662 (S.C. 1971).
31. 56 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 2599 (1970); 56 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 639 (1969); 56
S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 391 (1969).
32. 56 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 391, § 3 (1969).
33. Previously the court noted, "If the legislative intent can be determined with
19711
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found that, even if the disputed description were to be considered un-
constitutionally vague, the difficulty was resolved by a more precise
recital in the Act providing for the issuance of bonds by the Commis-
sion. u
The second constitutional question before the court was whether
the construction of the proposed facilities upon land leased by the
Commission from a private corporation, would violate the constitu-
tional prohibition against pledging the credit of the state for the benefit
of private concerns. The plaintiff contended that the improvements
placed upon the leased property might become the property of the
private lessor upon the expiration of the 99-year lease, resulting in
benefit to the lessor derived ultimately from the pledge of the District's
credit. The court found no evidence that the property would ever consti-
tute a benefit to the lessor; the Commission received the land practi-
cally rent-free, for a valid public purpose, and most of the improve-
ments would presumably be removable at the expiration of the lease.
Is there any constitutional prohibition against the creation of a
special purpose district in order to finance the construction of a zoolog-
ical park? The court answered the question in the negative, holding that
such a park, in its recreational and educational aspects, serves a public
purpose for which the legislature might create a special purpose district
with the power to issue bonds.
Closely related was the plaintiffs fourth attack, that the proposed
construction and operatin of the park was not a proper county func-
tion, and that the establishment of a special two-county district to
construct the park was "an attempt to do by indirection that which
cannot be done directly by one county."3 The court considered that
the attack was incorrectly based, in that it assumed that the primary
function of the zoo was a recreational one. The court instead empha-
sized the educational nature of the project, a purpose for which a single
reasonable certainty, the statute will not be declared inoperative." 181 S.E.2d at 666.
See Wingfield v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 147 S.C. 116, 144 S.E. 846 (1928).
34. 56 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 2599, § 1 (1970): "The General Assembly further
finds that the commission has acquired a tract of land consisting of one hundred sixteen
acres on the Saluda River ....
35. The plaintiffs based their contention upon the holding in Leonard v. Talbert,
225 S.C. 559, 83 S.E.2d 201 (1954), that a county cannot issue bonds for recreational
purposes and upon that in Conner v. Charleston High School Dist., 191 S.C. 412, 4
S.E.2d 431 (1939), to the effect that a subterfuge to circumvent a constitutional prohibi-
tion will not be sustained.
[Vol. 23
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county may issue bonds.'
The plaintiff also challenged the enabling statutes on the ground
that they created overlapping districts to finance similar facilities:
37
more precisely, that the legislation created the Riverbanks Parks Dis-
trict, which overlaps a previously existing special purpose district cre-
ated for similar or related purposes. The court noted a prior decision
to the effect that there was no constitutional difficulty in the establish-
ment of special purpose districts, provided that there is a reasonable
basis upon which to distinguish between the nature and types of services
and facilities to be provided by the respective districts.38 Emphasizing
the specialized facilities to be provided (zoo, botanical gardens, and
aquarium), as well as the expertise required for the maintenance and
operation thereof, the court concluded that there exists a sufficiently
reasonable basis for a distinction between the Riverbanks Parks Dis-
trict and the other special purpose districts in the area:
The jurisdiction of the Riverbanks Parks Commission is confined
to the specified area where the Park will be constructed. The facili-
ties to be constructed by it do not duplicate those proposed in the
recreation districts. Therefore, the recreation districts and the
Richland-Lexington Riverbanks Parks District will each operate
within their respective territory in performing their distinct func-
tions. "
The sixth constitutional issue before the court in Gould was
whether a special 15% overlapping debt limitation applied to the River-
banks District.4 All parties agreed that the ordinary 8% debt limitation
applied to the District, but there was some uncertainty as to the effect
upon the District of earlier decisions concerning the 15% limitation.4'
After a survey of those decisions, the court concluded that the 15%
36. See Powell v. Thomas, 214 S.C. 376,52 S.E.2d 782 (1949).
37. 181 S.E.2d at 669, quoting from Wagener v. Smith, 221 S.C. 438, 442, 71
S.E.2d I, 4 (1952): "There cannot be at the same time, within the same territory, two
distinct municipal corporations exercising the same powers, jurisdiction, and privileges."
38. See Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer Dist., 211 S.C. 77, 44 S.E.2d 88
(1947).
39. 181S.E.2d at 670.
40. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 5, limits the bonded debt of any county, township,
school district, municipal corporation or political division, to an amount not to exceed
8% of the assessed value of all the taxable property therein.
41. Berry v. Milliken, 234 S.C. 518, 109 S.E.2d 354 (1959) (limitation inapplicable
to district); Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer Dist., 211 S.C. 77, 44 S.E.2d 88 (1947)
(limitation applicable to district); Bagnall v. Clarendon & Orangeburg Bridge Dist., 131
S.C. 109, 126 S.E. 644 (1925) (limitation inapplicable to district).
1971]
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limitation should be held inapplicable only in cases in which "[T]he
purpose of the district was to fulfill some function which could only
be properly performed by going beyond the boundaries of a single
county." Concerning the Riverbanks Parks District, the court held:
While the establishment of a zoo would serve a public purpose,
S. .. [n]othing appears which would sustain a finding that such
undertaking necessarily involves governmental interests extending
beyond the boundaries of both counties.
We therefore concluded that the 15% debt limitation . . .
applies to the. . . Riverbanks Parks District.42
Concerning the 8% constitutional debt limit, the question arose:
in computing the effect of the limitation, must the 8% ceiling be re-
duced by the bonded indebtedness incurred by the City of Columbia
and by its underlying recreational districts? Noting that the District
was formed to create a facility separate and distinct from those created
by Columbia and the other recreational districts, and that the District
was itself a separate and distinct corporate entity, the court held that
the District was entitled to incur bonded indebtedness to the full 8%
limit, unencumbered by the other bond issues.
The court also held that, in computing the District's 15% debt
limitation, it was proper to exclude the bonded indebtedness of underly-
ing subdivisions which are subject to special constitutional amend-
ments increasing their capacity to incur bonded indebtedness.1
3
The plaintiffs ninth contention was that the inclusion of the City
of Columbia within the District and the imposition of a tax upon the
city's citizens to pay the District's bonds, imposes restrictions which
are not imposed upon any other city of the same class, in violation of
the state constitution.44 However, the court viewed the purpose of the
constitutional provision as follows:
[T]o bring about uniformity in legislation affecting municipalities
in the same classification and does not involve the power of the
General Assembly to legislate with reference to subjects affecting
42. 181 S.E.2d at 672.
43. See Baldwin v. McFadden, 234 S.C. 563, 109 S.E.2d 579 (1959).
44. S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § I, reads as follows:
The General Assembly shall provide by general laws for the organization
and classification of municipal corporations. The powers of each class
shall be defined so that no such corporation shall have any powers or be
subject to any restrictions other than all corporations of the same class.
[Vol. 23
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the relationship of the municipality or its residents to the balance
of the State.5
Emphasizing that "The taxes are levied against the taxpayer as a resi-
dent of the district and not of the city," and that the legislation does
not restrict, alter or impair any of the City's powers and functions, the
court held that the constitutional provision was not violated.
The next four constitutional issues concerned the methods pre-
scribed in the legislation for the appointment of members of the Com-
mission. The seven-member Commission consists of two members ap-
pointed by the Richland County Council, two members appointed by
the Lexington County Legislative Delegation, two members appointed
by the Mayor and Council of the City of Columbia, and one ex officio
member appointed by the Columbia Zoological Society.46
The appointments by the Richland County Council were attacked
on the theory that the Commission's function was not a purpose in
which a county may participate under Article X, Section 6, of the state
constitution." Such a constitutional attack was necessarily overruled
by the court's holding that the financing of a zoo by a county was
allowed by the constitutional provision.
The appointments by the Lexington County Legislative Delega-
tion were attacked as violating the constitutional requirement of the
separation of executive and legislative powers in government. The
court held that the statute "made the exercise of the appointive power
a legislative function," and that there was thus no violation of the
constitutional requirement.
The appointments by the Mayor and Council of the City of Col-
45. 181 S.E.2d at 673.
46. 56 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 391, § 2 (1969).
47. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 6, reads in part as follows:
The General Assembly shall not have power to authorize any county or
township to levy a tax or issue bonds for any purpose except for educa-
tional purposes, to build and repair public roads, buildings and bridges,
to maintain and support prisoners, pay jurors, County officers, and for
litigation, quarantine and court expenses and for ordinary County purpos-
es, to support paupers, and pay past indebtedness. . ..
48. S.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 14, reads as follows:
In the government of this State the legislative, executive and judicial pow-
ers of the Government shall be forever separate and distinct from each
other, and no person or persons exercising the functions of one of said
departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.
1971]
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umbia were attacked on the theory that the inclusion of the City within
the District was unconstitutional; the court's holding above disposed
of the issue.
The plaintiffs' fatal blow to the legislation was their contention
that the appointment by the Columbia Zoological Society (essentially
a civic or service organization) constitutes an unlawful delegation of
the legislature's appointive power, prohibited by Article Ill, Section 1,
of the state constitution. On the authority of Ashmore v. Greater
Greenville Sewer District49 the court so held, and noted:
The unconstitutional delegation of the appointive power to the
zoological society renders the district without a legally constituted
governing body and unable to function under the present legisla-
tion.0
Finally, the court held that the requirement that the annual budget
be submitted to the Lexington County Legislative Delegation for its
approval, 5' constitutes a violation of Article I, Section 14 of the state
constitution, which requires a separation of the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers of government, and also requires that no person
or persons exercising the functions of one branch should assume or
discharge the duties of another branch. The court held that the uncon-
stitutional provision was severable from the remainder of the Act, and
that its unconstitutionality did not affect the remainder.
Ill. EMINENT DOMAIN
In Timmons v. South Carolina Tricentennial Commission2 the
court held that the statute3 granting the S.C. Tricentennial Commis-
sion the power of eminent domain, was not unconstitutional as special
legislation; the court also concluded that the landowner was not denied
due process and equal protection in the condemnation proceedings by
which the Commission acquired her land.
The landowner first attacked the Act on the basis that it unconsti-
tutionally excludes certain counties from its effect. However, the court
49. Seen. 38, supra.
50. 181 S.E.2d at 674.
51. 56 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 391, § 3 (1969).
52. 254 S.C. 378, 175 S.E.2d 805 (1970).
53. 49 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 2194 (1956), as amended by 54 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE
2817 (1966); both hereinafter referred to as "the Act."
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found no such exclusion in the procedure prescribed in the granting of
the power of eminent domain to the Commission:
The Joint Resolution merely prescribed the manner in which the
power is to be exercised-that is, in accord with the general statu-
tory procedure set out in Chapter 3, Title 25 of the Code. The
language used is "in the manner prescribed. . .. ""
Secondly, on the authority of Elliott v. Sligh,5 the landowner
attacked the Act on the theory that it was unconstitutional as special
legislation,56 since in practice the Act applies only to one landowner,
Timmons. After a survey of decisions interpreting the holding in Elliot,
the court concluded:
There are no limitations in the legislation which granted this
power to [tihe . . .Commission. The fact [that] the funds have
been appropriated for acquisition of lands only in Charleston,
Richland and Greenville counties is not determinative of the issue.
The General Assembly could have appropriated funds for projects
in all 46 counties. The grant ofpower is in no way restricted ...
The power being general in its terms and general in its appli-
cation, this is not special legislation and does not smack of the
evil at which the constitutional prohibition was aimed. As Elliott
shows, the purpose of the provision is to prevent the legislature "in
its wisdom" from creating 46 different county governments or
penalizing some particular counties.5 7
Moreover, the court noted that the mere fact that legislation affects one
person or one locale, does not make such legislation special legisla-
tion.5
Concerning the requirements of due process in such an acquisition,
the court concluded that no particular procedure was required:
The constitutional requirements are satisfied if the condemnee has
54. 254 S.C. at 397, 175 S.E.2d at 814-15.
55. 233 S.C. 161, 103 S.E.2d 923 (1958). In Elliott the court held:
• ..The fact that legislation is expressed in general terms is not control-
ling. A law general in form, but special in its operation, violates a constitu-
tional inhibition of special legislation as much as one special in form. The
question must be decided not by the letter, but by the spirit and practical
operation of the act.
Id. at 164, 103 S.E.2d at 426; accord, Town of Forest Acres v. Town of Forest Lake,
226 S.C. 349, 85 S.E.2d 192 (1959).
56. See S.C. CONST. art. Ill, § 34.
57. 254 S.C. at 399, 175 S.E.2d at 815 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 399, 175 S.E.2d at 816. See Spitcaufsky v. Hatten, 353 Mo. 94, 182
S.W.2d at 86 (1944).
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(1) Reasonable notice, (2) Reasonable opportunity to be heard,
. . . and (3) Reasonable compensation for the property tak-
en. . . . If the trial accords the landowner the guarantee of ade-
quate compensation under equitable rules, the requirements of due
process are met. That will be done by the procedure prescribed for
this taking51
In South Carolina State Ports Authority v. Kaiser,"0 the Ports
Authority had condemned Kaiser's land; the lower court denied her a
jury trial in determining the amount of compensation. Kaiser appealed
on the ground that a denial of a full hearing, with witnesses being
examined and cross-examined, amounted to a denial of due process.
The court held that when there was no showing in the record or in the
appellant's brief as to precisely what facts she proposed to develop at
such a hearing, there was no showing of prejudice and thus no violation
of due process guarantees. The court pointed out that neither the stat-
ute under which the hearing was held, 61 nor due process generally,
required any particular procedure for the reception of evidence.
IV. ELECTIONS
In United Citizens Party v. South Carolina State Election
Commission,"2 a three-judge federal district court held that a statute,
the effect of which was that a political party having a primary can
control the date of the deadline for the submission of candidates by
other parties having no primary, violates both due process and the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
the redress of their grievances, and violates the constitutional prohibi-
tion against the delegation of legislative power to private bodies.
After holding that the United Citizens Party of South Carolina is
a properly certified party under the laws of the state,"3 the court faced
two constitutional issues: first, does S.C. Code Section 23-264, in that
59. 254 S.C. at 395-96, 175 S.E.2d at 814.
60. 254 S.C. 600, 176 S.E.2d 532 (1970).
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 25-101 et seq. (1962), entitled "Public Works Eminent
Domain Law."
62. 319 F. Supp. 784 (D.S.C. 1970).
63. Due to the proximity of election day, the United Citizens Party case raised a
host of intriguing issues, most of which are beyond the scope of this analysis; see
Jurisdictional Questions Involving Appeals of Injunctions and Declaratory Judgments
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it grants to establish political parties the power to fix the deadline by
which candidates for state office must be nominated and announced,
violate the constitutional prohibition against the delegation of legisla-
tive power? Second, does the requirement of Section 23-264, that candi-
dates entitled to a position on the ballot be nominated and announced
seven months prior to the general election, discriminate against the
United Citizens Party in violation of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments to the federal constitution?
After an examination of the relevant statutes, 64 the court conclud-
ed:
[A] political party having a primary can control the date of sub-
mission of candidates by parties having no primary by their con-
trol over the date of their state convention ...
But the potential delegation problem is much greater. Consi-
der what would happen if the Democratic Party broke with tradi-
tion and decided not to have a primary. . . .A party not having
a primary can hold its state convention at any time after three
weeks' notice ...
Thus it is clear that the sine qua non of the plaintiff's failure
to meet the statutory time limit for submitting the names of its
candidates was the Democratic Party's decision not to break with
tradition and to hold a primary in 1970.65
The court noted the general rule that "[A] legislature may not
delegate legislative functions to private persons or associations,"66 and
interpreted South Carolina law on the subject to be that
[Llegislative delegation to persons, groups or organizations unre-
lated to official government of power to nominate, appoint, or
elect public officers is unconstitutional as an invalid delegation of
legislative power and as a violation of equal protection of the laws
and due process of law clauses of the state Constitution of South
Carolina. . . .[subject to] a possible exception of a situation
where the unofficial persons or bodies may be said to have a
rational and substantial relation to the law to be administered.
7
Finding no such exceptional situation, the court declared Code Section
23-264 unconstitutional, and granted appropriate relief to the
plaintiffs.
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-262 (1962); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-264 (1970 Supp.);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-396 (1970 Supp.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-400.15 (1970 Supp.).
65. 319 F. Supp. at 788-89.
66. See 16 ANi. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law, § 249 (1964).
67. 319 F. Supp. at 787-88; see Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer Dist., 211 S.C.
77, 44 S.E.2d 88 (1947).
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V. PUBLIC UTILITIES
In Morgan v. Watts68 the court upheld the constitutionality of a
statute which provides that all property, leased to and operated by the
South Carolina Public Service Authority for the generation or trans-
mission of electric power, should be considered the property of the
Authority for tax purposes; the constitutional challenge was based
upon the theory that the statute seeks to exempt privately owned prop-
erty from taxation.
In 1969, the General Assembly enacted a statute"0 which removes
the ad valorem tax exemption previously enjoyed by privately owned
electric power cooperatives in South Carolina. The troublesome provi-
sion of the statute was Section 18, which provides that "[A]II property
leased to and operated by the . . . Authority for the generation or
transmission of electric power shall, for all tax purposes, be considered
the property of the Authority."70 Coupled with Section 59-8,11 which
exempts property of the Authority from taxation, Section 18's effect
was thus to exempt from taxation property owned by a private cooper-
ative, 2 but leased to and operated by the Authority. The plaintiff at-
tacked Section 18 as exempting privately owned property from taxa-
tion, in violation of Article X, Section 1, of the state constitution. 3
The court noted first that the leased property in question was a
vital and inseparable part of the Authority's entire system, and noted
secondly its earlier holding that the generation and transmission of
electric power by the Authority was a public and governmental func-
tion for the benefit of the people of South Carolina;" the court then
concluded that Section 18's exemption of the leased property from
taxation falls within the "municipal purposes" exception to the consti-
tutional requirement of uniform and equal taxation.
68. 255 S.C. 212, 178 S.E.2d 147 (1970).
69. 56 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 740 (1969).
70. 56 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 740, § 18 (1969).
71. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 59-8 (1962).
72. The Central Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., which in effect "[w]as merely the
eligible conduit through which these [federal] funds were made available for the expan-
sion of the Authority's electrical system at favorable interest rates." 255 S.C. at 215,
178 S.E.2d at 149.
73. S.C. CONST. art. X, § I.
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VI. SALARIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICERS
In State ex rel. MacLeod v. Mills,75 the court held that the 1970
General Appropriations Act (which reduced the salaries of the state
constitutional officers for fiscal year 1970) merely suspended, and did
not repeal, the permanent statute which fixed the salaries of the offi-
cers; that, as of the end of fiscal year 1970, the officers were thus
entitled to receive salaries at the level established in the permanent
statute; and finally that such a result did not violate the constitutional
prohibition against changing the officers' salaries during the term of
office to which the officers have been elected.
During its 1969 session, the General Assembly enacted permanent
provisions which established the salaries of the state constitutional
officers. 76 During its 1970 session, the General Assembly enacted the
General Appropriations Act77 which provided for substantial reduc-
tions in the officers' salaries. Of particular importance is the following
provision of the Appropriations Act: "All Acts or parts of Acts incon-
sistent with any of the provisions of Part I of this Act are hereby
suspended for the fiscal year 1970-71. ' '7s Finding such language clear
and unambiguous, the court held that the legislature intended to sus-
pend temporarily, rather than repeal, the relevant portions of the per-
manent statute; therefore, as of July 1, 1971, the officers were entitled
to receive salary increases to the extent provided in the permanent
statute.
Having so held, the court was thus squarely presented with the
question of whether such increases violate constitutional provisions
that the compensation of the state constitutional officers shall not be
changed during their terms of office. 79 The court held that there was
no constitutional violation, because both the permanent statute and the
suspending Appropriations Act were not enacted during the officers'
terms of office. The court concluded, "[S]alaries may vary during the
75. 256 S.C. 21,180 S.E.2d 638 (1971).
76. 56 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 595, Part II, Permanent Provisions, § 15 (1969).
77. 56 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 2085 (1970).
78. Id.
79. S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13, provides "The Governor and Lieutenant Governor
shall, at stated times, receive for their services compensation, which shall be neither
increased nor diminished during the period for which they shall have been elected." S.C.
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term of office so long as they were fixed prior to the commencement
of such term of office."
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
In Sadler v. Lyle the court held that a 1918 constitutional amend-
ment exempting Rock Hill from a constitutional debt limit, was pro-
perly submitted to the electorate and approved, and was not invalid
merely because the one question submitted exempted both Rock Hill
and Florence from the debt limit.
The plaintiff brought an action to enjoin the issuance of all general
obligation bonds by Rock Hill, which had been approved in a special
election in 1969. In holding the election and in issuing the bonds, the
City of Rock Hill had relied upon an amendment to the South Carolina
Constitution,"' submitted to the voters in the 1918 general election,
which exempted Rock Hill and Florence from an 8% constitutional
debt ceiling. The plaintiff contended that the 1918 amendment was not
properly submitted to the people and approved, because it violated
Article XVI, Section 2, of the South Carolina Constitution,"2 and was
therefore not a valid part of the constitution.
The court examined the history of such amendments since 1895,
and found a
[L]egislative interpretation that the submission of a constitutional
amendment relaxing the debt limit of several municipalities for
several purposes by a single question does not violate the provi-
sions of Article XVI, Section 2.3
The court found the legislative construction to be strongly per-
suasive, and concluded that the manner of submitting the 1918 amend-
ment to the people was proper.
VIII. DIFFICULTY IN COMPLYING WITH STATUTE
In State v. Life Insurance Co.Y the court held that the difficulty
80. 254 S.C. 535, 176 S.E.2d 290 (1970).
81. Amending S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 7, and S.C. CoNsT. art. X, § S.
82. S.C. CONST. art. XVI, § 2, provides, "If two or more amendments shall be
submitted at the same time, they shall be submitted in such a manner that the elector
shall vote for or against each of such amendments separately."
83. 254 S.C. at 543, 176 S.E.2d at 293.
84. 254 S.C. 286, 175 S.E.2d 203 (1970).
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which might be experienced by insurers in complying with a fee-exemp-
tion statute,ns in order to get the full benefit thereof, does not warrant
judicial interference or relief.
The State brought an action to recover certain additional license
fees as well as interest and penalties, allegedly due by the respondent
life insurance company under S.C. Code Sections 37-122 and 37-124.
The Commissioner calculated the amount of reduction in fees to which
the respondent was entitled under Section 37-123, on the basis of the
amounts of life insurance reserves invested in South Carolina on De-
cember 31st of each of the years involved; the respondent contended,
and the lower court held, that the Commissioner should have calculated
an average figure for each of the particular years. No particular mode
of calculation was set forth in the statute. The respondent further con-
tended that, since the statute's obvious object was to encourage foreign
investment in South Carolina, and since the insurer gets the benefit of
the statutory exemptions only during the time its investments are ac-
tually made and maintained in the state, it was "unrealistic, unfair, and
inequitable" to look solely to the December 31st figure in calculating
the insurer's invested reserves.
Agreeing that "[T]he use of December 31st as a reserve date might
make it difficult for an insurer to get the full benefit of Sec. 37-123,"
the court nevertheless held:
[T]he deduction and benefit is allowed as a matter of legislative
grace. In order to take advantage of this statute the respondent
was required to meet the conditions of the statute which granted
the benefit.
The legislature could have, if so minded, adopted an exemp-
tion more favorable to foreign insurers. On the other hand, it
could have adopted none at all.86
IX. CIVIL ARREST
In Carter v. Lynch" the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
85. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-122 (1962) imposes upon each foreign insurance com-
pany an additional and graded license fee of an amount equal to two percent of all
premiums collected on life insurance policies in South Carolina. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-
124 (1962) provides the same for premiums collected on accident insurance policies. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 37-123 (1962) provides for reductions in such fees, contingent upon the
level of the insurance company's investments in South Carolina.
86. 254 S.C. at 294-5, 175 S.E.2d at 207; accord, Southern Soya Corp. v. Wasson,
252 S.C. 484, 167 S.E.2d 311 (1969).
87. 429 F.2d 154 (4th Cir. 1970).
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the petitioner's civil arrest, in contempt for failure to pay a judgment
against him for physical assault, did not violate the constitutional
prohibition against imprisonment for debt, and that South Carolina's
civil arrest and release statutes violate neither substantive nor proce-
dural due process.
The court first pointed out that the civil arrest statute" is explicitly
limited to actions "for the recovery of damages in a cause of action
not arising out of contract," and then applied South Carolina law to
the effect that causes of action arising ex delicto are not within the
constitutional proscription. 9
South Carolina's procedure for discharge from civil arresto was
attacked on two theories: that the procedure places an undue burden
upon the petitioner of convincing the court that his sworn accounting
is true; and that the procedure allows continued incarceration despite
the absence of ordinary criminal processes, thus violating the require-
ments of due process. The court saw no constitutional difficulty in
placing such a burden of proof upon the petitioner, since the applicant
for a writ of habeas corpus carries the same burden.9 The court consi-
dered the procedure required by statute to be "more than sufficient to
ensure fairness in the critical exploration." Moreover, the procedure is
properly a subject of legislation: "While undoubtedly harsh in imple-
mentation, the arrest and release sections . . . are well within the
State's power to secure enforcement of the judgments of its courts."
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-802 (1962) reads as follows:
Arrest in civil actions permitted in certain cases.-The defendant may be
arrested, as prescribed in this article, in the following cases:
(6) In an action for the recovery of damages in a cause of action not
arising out of contract when the defendant is a non-resident of the State
or is about to remove therefrom or when the action is for an injury to
person or character or for injury to or wrongfully taking, detaining or
converting property.
89. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24 provides, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt
except in cases of fraud." See, e.g., Exparte Berry, 85 S.C. 243, 67 S.E. 225 (1910); Ex
parte Hollman, 79 S.C. 9, 60 S.E. 19 (1908).
90. For his release a judgment debtor is required to make a full accounting of all
his property, supported by an oath that he has made no transfers, either before or after
suit was instituted, to defraud his creditors. An assignment of the listed properties must
then be made. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-844 to -846 (1962).
91. See Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. den. sub non.
Pepersack v. Hall, 374 U.S. 809 (1963).
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X. STATUTORY VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH
In Abernathy v. Conroy92 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the constitutionality both of a Charleston parade ordinance and
that of South Carolina's common-law definition of riot.
The plaintiffs were arrested in Charleston during a peaceful,
midnight march from a church to a public park, where they were to
conduct a protest prayer vigil with 250 of the their followers. The
plaintiffs were charged with riot and parading without a permit. The
plaintiffs had applied for and received permits for previous assemblies
and processions in Charleston, but did not apply for one on this occa-
sion because Section 31-195 of the Charleston City Code expressly
prohibits the granting of a permit for a parade to terminate after 8
p.m.
On appeal, the plaintiffs first argued that Section 31-195 arbitrar-
ily suspends the exercise of a citizen's first and fourteenth amendment
rights at 8 p.m., in that it makes no provision for the needs of groups
which must march after 8 p.m. The court noted:
Peaceful picketing and parading are methods of expression enti-
tled to first amendment protection, but they are methods subject
to greater regulation than other forms of expression.93
The court further explained that the form that parading takes more
often brings it into competition with "legitimate non-speech interests,
which the state has a right to protect." The court concluded that the
resolution of such conflicts "often means that the right to parade must
yield to reasonable state regulation of time, place, manner, and dura-
tion." Thus the court balanced the inconvenience of forcing the march-
ers to assemble on weekends and in the late afternoons, against the
interests of Charleston in so limiting parades; it found legitimate
government interests in preserving serentity in the evenings for the
mutual benefit of all citizens, in the decreased danger of violence in
daytime parades, and in the increased ease with which such violent
lawbreakers might be apprehended in a daytime parade, and thus up-
held the constitutionality of Section 31-195.
The plaintiffs' second contention was that South Carolina's defi-
92. 429 F.2d 1170 (4th Cir. 1970).
93. 429 F.2d at 1173.
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nition of riot9" offends the first and fourteenth amendments because of
vagueness and overbreadth. The court acknowledged that the vagueness
argument involved the terms "tumultuous disturbance of the peace"
and "terrific and violent manner." The court concluded:
In our opinion these are not obscure terms. To the man on
the street, we think "a tumultuous disturbance of the peace"
clearly connotes noisy conduct . . . , and violence is a term with
which twentieth century Americans are particularly well acquaint-
ed. . . . When the terms are seen in the context of the whole
definition, they plainly suggest to the average citizen noisy, fright-
ening conduct accompanied by harmful physical force.s
Concerning the overbreadth argument, the court set out the test: "A
law is too broad under the Constitution when it sweeps within its ambit
constitutionally protected behavior." After a survey of South Carolina
decisions concerning common law riot convictions, the court conclud-
ed:
[T]here can be no valid conviction for riot under South Carolina
law without violence,. . .violent acts are not accorded protection
under the first amendment, even though they also constitute ex-
pressive or communicative conduct."
The court held that no balancing test was necessary, and that South
Carolina might, consistently with the overbreadth doctrine, proscribe
"violent activity that is also noisy and frightening."
In State v. Burgin9" the court held that a South Carolina obscenity
statute 8 was not unconstitutional as being vague or overly broad. The
petitioner had been convicted under a provision which prohibits, inter
alia, the sale or distribution of "obscene" matter." Under the statute,
"obscene" is defined thus:
94. South Carolina's common law definition of riot is:
[A] tumultuous disturbance of the peace, by three or more persons assem-
bled together, of their own authority, with the intent mutually to assist
each other against anyone who shall oppose them, and putting their design
into execution in a terrific and violent manner, whether the object was
lawful or not.
State v. Connolly, 3 Rich. 337, 338 (1832).
95. 429 F.2d at 1175.
96. Id. at 1176.
97. 255 S.C. 237, 178 S.E.2d 325 (1970).
98. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-414.1 et seq. (1970 Supp.).
99. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-414.2 (1970 Supp.) reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to send or cause to be sent,
to bring or cause to be brought into South Carolina for sale or distribu-
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"Obscene" means that to the average person, applying contempo-
rary standards, the predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a
whole, is to prurient interest among which is a shameful or morbid
interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and which goes substantially
beyond customary limits of candor in description or representa-
tion of such matters. .... 10
The court noted that the obscenity definition is intended to restate, and
substantially does so restate, the test developed and approved in Roth
v. United States.'' Moreover, the South Carolina statute was consider-
ably more detailed than the state and federal statutes upheld in Roth.
On such grounds the court held that the South Carolina statute was
neither vague nor overbroad.
In Town of Honea Path v. Flynn 0 2 the court held that an
ordinance0 3 making it unlawful to assault, resist, abuse or in any man-
ner interfere with any employee of the town in the discharge of his duty,
was unconstitutionally vague. The court found that Flynn's conviction
under the ordinance "may well have rested upon nothing more than
mere words uttered by the appellant which were not pleasing to the
local police officers." The court's voiding of the ordinance as unconsti-
tutionally vague centered upon the ordinance's failure to define the
term "abuse":
One's view as to what the term was intended to mean or connote
would likely vary considerably, depending upon whether the view-
point was that of the alleged abuser or that of the person allegedly
abused.
To allow . . . officers . . . the discretion to arrest and prose-
cute those whom they feel have made inappropriate remarks upon
a charge of interference would . . . invite gross abuses of discre-
tion and impose unfair penalties and burdens upon the citizenry. 04
tion, or to prepare, publish, print, exhibit, distribute or offer to distribute
in the State, or have in his possession with intent to distribute, or to exhibit
or offer to distribute, any obscene matter.
100. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-414.1 (1970 Supp.).
101. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
102. 255 S.C. 32, 176 S.E.2d 564 (1970).
103. Honea Path, S.C., Ordinance 102 provides, "It shall be unlawful for any
person to assault, resist, abuse or in any manner, by word or act, interefere with a police
officer or any other office or employee of the City in the discharge of his duty ..
104. 255 S.C. at 40, 176 S.E.2d at 567.
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Xl. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In Willis v. Leeke'0 5 the court held that the transfer of the petition-
er's indictment from a general sessions court, which utilized a jury of
twelve, to a county court, which had concurrent jurisdiction over the
offense charged but which used a jury of six, denied the petitioner
neither due process nor equal protection.
The petitioner was indicted for assault and battery with intent to
kill, by the grand jury at a term of the Greenville County Court of
General Sessions; the indictment was then transferred to the Greenville
County Court, which had concurrent jurisdiction of the offense,"' as
well as a smaller jury. 0 7 As was the general practice in the county, the
clerk of court transferred the indictment at the direction of the circuit
solicitor. The petitioner was convicted of the lesser offense of assault
and battery of a high and aggravated nature and sentenced to a period
of imprisonment; the instant appeal was from a lower court order
denying the petitioner's application for post-conviction relief.
Rather than insist upon any constitutional right to a twelve-mem-
ber jury, 08 the petitioner urged that the solicitor's exercise of his "un-
reviewable discretion" in determining which cases were to be trans-
ferred to the county court, deprived him of due process and equal
protection. The court emphasized that the county court's concurrent
jurisdiction was conferred by law and not by the actual transfer,' and
then concluded:
The mere fact that the clerk of court customarily relied upon the
solicitor to designate the cases to be transferred to the county
court deprived appellant of no constitutional right. Appellant's
case was within the jurisdiction of the county court, which was the
sole statutory criterion for transfer."'
X1I. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In re Chipley"I held that a disciplinary rule, which provides that
105. 255 S.C. 230, 178 S.E.2d 251 (1970).
106, S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-655 (1962).
107. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 22; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-671 (1962).
108. The existence of any such right was denied in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78 (1970). See also State v. Cowart, 251 S.C. 360, 162 S.E.2d 535 (1965).
109. See State v. Douglas, 245 S.C. 83, 138 S.E.2d 845 (1964).
110. 255 S.C. at 236, 178 S.E.2d at 254.
11I. 254 S.C. 588, 176 S.E.2d 412 (1970).
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the practice of law by one affected by disqualifying emotional or men-
tal instability amounts to constructive misconduct," 2 was not so vague
and indefinite as to deprive the attorney of due process.
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline rec-
ommended that the respondent be indefinitely suspended from the prac-
tice of law, on the ground of mental and emotional instability; the
respondent contended that the rule, upon the authority of which the
recommendation had been made,
[lI]s so vague and indefinite as to deprive the respondent of rights
guaranteed him under the due process clauses of both the Consti-
tution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of
South Carolina.1
3
In rejecting the respondent's contention, the court said:
The use of the phrase "in the judgment of ordinary men" simply
signifies that in deciding whether disqualifying instability exists,
the standards of the perfectionist. . . are to be avoided, and that
of the man of ordinary tolerance for the imperfections of others
is to be applied.'
XIII. RIGHTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL
In Dash v. Commanding General"5 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed Judge Russell's decision,"' which upheld the consti-
tutionality of a Fort Jackson regulation prohibiting the distribution of
printed material without the post commander's consent, and which
sustained the commander's denial of the plaintiff's request for a public
meeting on the post.
0. ALLEN JEFFCOAT, I I I
112. S.C. CODE ANN. Rule on Disciplinary Procedure for Attorneys, § 4 (1970
Supp.), reads as follows:
Misconduct, as the term is used herein, means any one or more of the
following:
(e) emotional or mental instability so uncertain, as in the judgment
of ordinary men, would render a person incapable of exercising such judg-
ment and discretion as necessary for the protection of the rights of others
and/or their property or interest in property.
113. 254 S.C. at 591, 176 S.E.2d at 413.
114. Id. at 591-2, 176 S.E.2d at413.
115. 429 F.2d 427, case 2 (4th Cir. 1970) (mem).
116. See Dash v. Commanding General, 307 F. Supp. 849 (D.S.C. 1969).
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